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Abstract
Hoekman, Michalopoulos,  and Winters  discuss options  that  Recognition that some WTO  agreements need to be
could be considered  in the World Trade Organization  adapted to make them more  supportive of development,  and
(WTO)  to provide more favorable treatment-so-called  a consequent willingness  by industrial countries  to modify
special and differential  treatment (SDT)-to small  and low-  them.
income  countries.  They argue  that there is a need both for  * Expansion of development assistance to bolster trade
differentiation  across WTO members and for steps  that  capacity in poor countries  and strengthening  of the links
would  benefit all developing countries.  The authors  suggest  between  trade-related  technical assistance  and the
the following  to make the Doha Round more supportive of  mechanisms through  which aid  priorities are determined  in
development:  developing  countries
* A binding commitment by industrial  countries  to  In practice, calls for specific types  of SDT often appear to
abolish export subsidies  and nontariff barriers (tariff quotas)  be  motivated  by a perception  that a certain WTO rule is
and to reduce most-favored-nation  tariffs on labor-intensive  "anti-development"  and that therefore developing countries
products of export interest to developing countries  to no  should be exempted  from the rule in question. The authors
more than 5 percent  in 2010, and to no more than 10  suggest that the appropriate solution to such problems is to
percent for agricultural products.  All tariffs on manufactures  change the rules rather than seek an opt-out.  What should
should  go to zero by 2015, the target date for the  be up front changes in rules and what should  be  part of the
achievement  of the Millennium Development Goals.  negotiating  agenda  is a major issue which needs to be
Liberalization  should also be undertaken by developing  addressed at the Cancun Ministerial  meeting.
countries on the basis  of a formula approach.  The suggestion that SDT should focus primarily on WTO
* A binding commitment by industrial  countries on  rules and be limited to those countries that need it most-
services to expand temporary access  for service providers by  very small and poor economies-implies  that criteria should
a specific amount-for  example, equal to an additional  1  be  adopted to differentiate between  countries. Leaving  this
percent  of the workforce-and  not to restrict cross-border  to self-declaration-the  current approach-is  not feasible,
trade (for example,  by telecom channels).  while reliance  on case-by-case,  agreement-specific
* Unilateral action by all industrial  countries  to extend  negotiation can generate excessive costs, discretion,  and
preferential market access  for less developed  countries, and  associated uncertainty. While the authors' preference  is for a
to simplify  eligibility criteria, especially  rules of origin.  simple rule-of-thumb  approach to determine eligibility,  this
* Affirmation by the WVTO  that core disciplines  relating  is an issue that requires  much more thought and discussion.
to the use of trade policy apply equally to all WTO  They suggest that WTO members  establish a high-level
members.  group to consider  criteria that could be used for
* Acceptance  of the principle  that for small and low-  differentiation  purposes and to determine  the set of
income countries  "one size  does not fit all" when it comes  agreements  to which differentiation  will apply.
to domestic regulation and to WTO agreements  requiring
substantial investment of resources.
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Abstract: This paper discusses options that could be considered in the WTO to respond to the
call of WTO trade ministers to make special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions in the
WTO more effective. We argue for a new approach that puts the emphasis on non-
discriminatory liberalization of trade in goods and services  in which developing countries
have an export interest; complemented by efforts to improve the development relevance of
WTO rules and consideration of mechanisms to allow for greater differentiation  across WTO
members  in determining the reach of WTO disciplines.
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International trade is important for development  and poverty alleviation.  It helps raise
and sustain growth-a fundamental requirement  for reducing poverty-by giving firms
and households access to world markets for goods, services and knowledge,  lowering
prices and increasing the quality and variety of consumption goods, and fostering the
specialization  of economic activity into areas where countries have a comparative
advantage.  Trade and trade opportunities are important for generating the investment and
positive externalities that are associated with learning through the diffusion and
absorption of technology.  Policies that shelter economic agents from the world market
impede these spillover benefits and dynamic gains (Bhagwati,  1988; Irwin, 2001). This
does not imply that 'one size fits all' or to deny that adjustment costs and measures to
safeguard the interests of poor households must be considered in the design of policies.
Understanding and addressing the impacts of reform on the poor and vulnerable in
society, and taking action to facilitate  adjustment is necessary (McCulloch et al.,  2001).
The primary determinant of the benefits from trade is a country's own policies-
the principle that 'what you do is what you get'. Determining the appropriate trade policy
stance and the associated complementary policies for a country should consequently
figure in the design of development and poverty-reduction strategies.  In part, however,
this policy stance will be affected by what other countries do. A major question
confronting many developing country governments is if and how trade policy should take
into account that the global trade environment is distorted by a variety of policies pursued
by trading partners. Measures that restrict market access for developing countries'  exports
goods and services and that lower (raise) the prices of their exports (imports) have direct
negative effects on investment incentives  and the growth potential  of their economies.
For example, agricultural support policies-high rates of subsidization  and trade
barriers-by developed countries increase world price volatility, lock developing
countries out of major markets and can lead to import surges that have highly detrimental
effects  on developing country farmers. The existence of such policies has become a major
political barrier to further trade policy reform in developing countries.
The WTO is a forum both to negotiate improved market access and to agree to
'rules of the game' for trade-related policies. Developing countries gain from both
1dimensions. A rules-based world trading system is beneficial to developing countries  as
they are mostly small players on world markets with little ability to influence the policies
of large countries. The rules of the WTO can also be beneficial by reducing uncertainty
regarding the policies that will be applied by governments-thus potentially helping to
increase domestic investment and reduce risks.
Much obviously depends, however,  on getting the rules  'right'.  To a significant
extent WTO rules reflect the 'interests' of rich countries:  they are less demanding about
distortionary policies that are used by these countries and they largely mirror the ("best
practice") disciplines  that have over time been put in place by them.  Thus, the much
greater latitude that exists in the WTO for the use of agricultural subsidization,  for
example, reflects the use of such support policies in many developed countries.  The same
is true for the permissive  approach that has historically been taken towards  the use of
import quotas on textile products-which in principle was prohibited by GATT rules.
More recently, the inclusion of rules on the protection of intellectual property rights has
led to perceptions that the WTO contract continues to be unbalanced.'
Ensuring that the rules are supportive of development and are seen to be so by the
majority of stakeholders  in society is perhaps the most fundamental challenge
confronting the WTO from a development  point of view. Developing countries have
complemented  efforts to influence the content of WTO rules with a strategy of seeking
'differential  and more favorable treatment' (Hudec,  1987; Finger,  1991; Michalopoulos,
2000). Generally captured  in the term special and differential  treatment (SDT), many
provisions in the WTO call for the granting of preferential  access to markets for
developing  countries, exemptions (transitory and permanent) from certain rules, and
development assistance.  One approach that has been pursued by developing countries in
an effort to increase the net benefits from WTO membership  has been to seek to expand
the reach of SDT. This paper discusses SDT options and mechanisms that could be
considered as part of the WTO's Doha Agenda.2  It is based on a longer report that
'See  World Bank (2002), Finger and Schuler (2000)  and Hoekman and Kostecki (2001)  for discussion  and
references to the literature.
2  See Hart and Dymond (2003), Oyejide (2002), Stevens  (2002), Youssef, (2000), Page (2000) and
Michalopoulos (2001) for complementary analyses and discussions of alternative  options.
2develops the arguments in greater depth and  assesses the various proposals that have
been submitted to the WTO on SDT (Hoekman et al. 2003).
A premise underlying our approach  is that efforts to enhance the development
relevance of the WTO need to distinguish the question of more favorable treatment of
developing countries from the broader issue of ensuring that WTO rules and disciplines
support development. The second dimension is by far more important, but it goes well
beyond the specific language  that is found in WTO agreements relating to developing
country interests. Instead,  it revolves around whether a particular WTO rule makes sense
for developing countries to implement.
SDT has arguably not been  an effective instrument to promote development for
reasons discussed at greater length below. The key requirements for helping countries to
use trade for development include a concerted effort to reduce market access barriers  and
agricultural trade distortions on a nondiscriminatory basis; strengthening mechanisms  to
increase the likelihood that WTO rules support development prospects;  recognizing that
resource constraints  in small and low income countries may require temporary
exemptions from multilateral rules;  and making greater efforts to tie trade-related
assistance to national development priorities.  Specifically,  we suggest that the following
be considered by WTO members:
*  A binding commitment by developed countries to abolish export subsidies and
NTBs.(tariff quotas) and to reduce MFN tariffs on labor-intensive products of
export interest to developing countries to no more than 5 percent in 2010,  and to
no more than 10 percent for agricultural products. All tariffs on manufactures
should go to zero by 2015, the target date for the achievement of the MDGs. The
liberalization should include developing countries, on the basis of a formula
approach that reduces the variance in tariffs very substantially and gives credit for
past unilateral trade liberalization.
*  A binding commitment by developed countries on services to expand temporary
access for service providers by a specific amount-e.g.,  equal to an additional one
percent of the workforce-and  not to restrict cross-border trade (e.g., via telecom
channels).
*  Unilateral action by all developed countries to extend preferential  market access
for LDCs, and to simplify eligibility criteria,  especially rules of origin.
*  Affirmation by the WTO that core disciplines relating to the use of trade policy
should apply equally to all WTO members.
*  Acceptance of the principle that for small and low income countries,  'one size
does not fit all' when it comes to WTO rules on domestic regulation or that
require substantial  investments to be implemented.
3*  Recognition  that some WTO agreements need to be adapted to make them more
supportive of development,  and a consequent willingness to change the rules and
make them more development oriented.
*  Expansion of development assistance to bolster trade capacity in poor countries
and strengthening the linkages between trade-related technical  assistance and the
mechanisms through which aid priorities are determined in developing  countries.
The elements of this 'package' are both consistent with, and would do much to realize,
the objectives  laid out in para 2 of the Doha declaration:  ".. we shall continue to make
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries,  and especially the least-
developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate  with
the needs of their economic development.  In this context,  enhanced market access,
balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably  financed technical assistance and capacity-
building programmes have important roles to play" (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1).  In the
penultimate section of the paper we discuss briefly how the suggested 'package' can be
mapped into the ongoing discussions on SDT.
I. Differential and More Favorable Treatment
The 1979 'Enabling Clause', entitled Differential and More Favorable Treatment,
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, made SDT a central
element of the trading system.  It calls for preferential  market access for developing
countries, limits reciprocity in negotiating rounds to levels 'consistent with development
needs' and provides developing countries with greater freedom to use trade policies than
would otherwise be permitted by GATT rules.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed the importance of SDT by stating
that 'provisions  for special and differential treatment are  an integral part of the WTO
agreements'.  It called for a review of WTO SDT provisions with the objective of
"strengthening them and making them more precise,  effective and operational"  [para.  44].
The Declaration also states that "modalities  for further commitments,  including
provisions for special and differential treatment, be established no later than 31  March
2003'  [para.  14].  Efforts during 2002 to come to agreement  on ways to strengthen  and
4operationalize SDT provisions  were not successful.  Indeed, it became  apparent that there
are deep divisions between WTO members on how to improve SDT provisions.3
There are currently three major dimensions  of SDT in the WTO-preferential
access for developing countries to developed country markets; promises by developed
countries to provide technical assistance to lower-income  economies  to help them
implement multilateral rules; and  exemptions from certain WTO rules. Some of the latter
are transitory, e.g. for rules on customs valuation, the abolition of trade-related
investment measures (TRIMs), and implementation of stronger protection  of intellectual
property rights under the Agreement on TRIPS, and some permanent,  e.g., limited
reciprocity under the Enabling Clause or Article XVIII GATT.4 A good case exists for all
three types of SDT under certain circumstances,  but to make SDT a more effective
instrument, it must be re-thought  and targeted more narrowly towards those that need it
the most.
One rationale for SDT is essentially that very small and/or low income economies
lack the institutional development or minimum  scale to manage  the full panoply of WTO
rules or, at least, might find the returns to creating the institutions to apply them
effectively outweighed by the costs. This is not to say that the WTO rules are not sound
policy prescriptions-although  in some cases they are not-simply that some rules
become unambiguously beneficial only as countries become richer. Small  and/or poor
countries may also lack the resources to overcome natural obstacles to trade or to use
policies that in principle would be the most efficient in addressing market failures. This
could give rise to a case for offering such countries preferential access to markets as well
as financial  and technical  assistance.
Historically, the major focus of efforts to operationalize  SDT have centered on
preferential  access through the Generalized System of Preferences  (GSP) and ensuring
that the extent of reciprocity in periodic multilateral trade negotiations was limited
(Laird, Safadi and Turini, 2002; Finger and Winters, 2002).  One option for strengthening
3  For a succinct but comprehensive summary of the post-Doha SDT discussions  in the WTO, see the
ICTSD/IISD Doha Round Briefing Series,  vol. 1,  no.  13, February 2003  (www.ictsd.org).
4 Article XVIII allows developing  to use trade policies in the pursuit of industrial  development objectives
and to protect the balance  of payments,  imposing weaker disciplines than on industrialized countries.  There
are also many exhortations to developed  countries to 'take into account'  the interests of the developing
countries  in the application of WTO rules and disciplines.
5SDT that has been actively pursued by developed countries in recent years has been to
deepen trade preferences  for least developed countries (LDCs) and sub-Saharan Africa.
Examples are the EU Everything But Arns initiative-which grants duty- and quota-free
access for all goods exported by LDCs (with delayed implementation  for three important
products-sugar,  rice, and bananas), and the US African Growth and Opportunities Act,
which does the same for a large number of African countries.  Experience has shown that
such schemes can have a significant positive effect on recipients, but that very much
depends on their supply side capacity (e.g. a large proportion of the benefits of GSP have
accrued to a small number of more advanced developing countries), their ability to put
the rents generated to good use, and on the ancillary documentary requirements that are
imposed by preference-granting  countries.  Recent research reveals that liberal rules of
origin are critical for a strong trade response in sectors  such as textiles and clothing
(Inama, 2002; Brenton, 2003; Brenton and Manchin, 2002; Mattoo et al. 2002).
Preferences  are by definition discriminatory-to give some countries preferential
access implies, and depends for its effects on, not giving such access to others. A major
policy question that arises is which countries should be eligible for preferential market
access.  In practice there is a hierarchy of preferences,  with the most preferred countries
generally being members of reciprocal free trade agreements (EU, NAFTA, EU-FTAs,
etc.), followed by LDCs-which in principle often have free access to major markets-
and other developing countries,  which generally get GSP preferences.  In many
jurisdictions, GSP status does not involve duty free treatment, instead being limited to a
tariff reduction  (Inama, 2003).
From a poverty reduction point of view-and in light of the  Millennium
Development Goals-a good case can be made that preferences should focus on the poor,
wherever they are geographically located, and not on a limited set of countries.  In
absolute terms, most poor people live in countries that are not LDCs-especially China
and India. Limiting preferences  to LDCs or concentrating on a specific geographic region
such as sub-Saharan Africa-while appropriate  in light of limited institutional capacity
and infrastructure  weaknesses  in these countries-ignores the majority of the poor in the
world today (Winters, 2001).
6One way forward would be to agree on a single preferential  tariff rate-zero-for
all products  currently benefiting from GSP status in developed countries  (as is the case
presently in the US), thereby removing all partial preferences.  Extending preferential
duty-free access to large countries such as India and China will be very difficult
politically-one reason why duty-free access for much of Africa and the LDCs could be
implemented is that these countries account for less than 0.5 percent of world trade.
Given the political reality that developed  nations will not grant large and/or higher
income developing countries unconditional preferential  market access, this will have to
occur through MFN liberalization.  In turn,  this will require a willingness  on the part of
developing countries to engage in reciprocity.  But this is in their own interest, for, as
mentioned above, much of the benefit from trade policy reforms is generated by a
country's own actions.5 Thus, rather than seeking to extend GSP programs for all
developing countries-which have proven to be of limited value, with only a few
countries benefiting  significantly-greater  and more sustainable  gains can be obtained
through MFN liberalization.  This is also something that the WTO is designed to deliver.
Thus, our first recommendation:
1. Market access: Give priority to MFN liberalization of trade in goods and services in
which developing countries have an actual or potential export interest
A strong case can be made that MFN-based market access will have the greatest
beneficial  impact on development.  One reason for this is that it involves an element of
'rebalancing' of the WTO as it implies that elements of 'reverse SDT'-special opt-outs
and exemptions that benefit interest groups in industrialized countries at the expense of
developing countries-would be removed. Agricultural subsidy programs, textile import
quotas, tariff peaks and escalation that imply high rates of effective protection for
developed country industries  are examples.  Such continued protection implies that
products produced by poor people are subject to higher tariffs than products produced by
the non-poor. Reversing this situation through a MFN-based liberalization  program that
centers on these sectors would not only be very beneficial to developing countries (and
5 Our support for reciprocity in the market access context does not extend to other elements of SDT
discussed below, in particular the need for differentiation in the reach of resource-intensive  WTO
7developed country consumers), but also help remove a major political barrier to further
trade reforms in developing countries by providing a positive demonstration effect.
Implementing  this recommendation  has implications  for the choice of negotiating
modalities on tariffs. A Swiss type formula, as proposed by the Chair of the WTO market
access committee, is much preferable to a request-offer or linear cut approach  (Francois
and Martin,  2003).6 Any formula-based  MFN liberalization  should extend to middle-
income countries, which are among the most dynamic  markets in the world and where
trade barriers are often substantially higher than in developed countries.  It would usefully
extend to LDCs as well. Reciprocity is the engine of the WTO; it is not engaging in
reciprocal  exchange of market access concessions  that has helped create the current
structure of protection confronting developing  countries.7
In addition to defining negotiating modalities,  WTO members should set a
concrete timetable (deadline)  and agree on specific benchmarks  for product coverage  and
the maximum tariff that is to be permitted.  We suggest that a target be set that at the end
of the Doha round implementation period-say 2010-MEN tariffs on manufacturing
products of export interest to developing countries,  defined to include the set of labor-
intensive products such as footwear, textiles and apparel,8 will not exceed 5 percent and
those in agriculture  10 percent. Additionally,  it could be agreed that by 2015, the target
date for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals all tariffs on developing
country exports of manufactures will be eliminated, in effect removing the problem of
tariff peaks and associated tariff escalation.  Both of these measures will benefit the
millions of poor in all developing countries who are employed in these activities..
Reciprocal concessions will be necessary in order to make complete developed-
country liberalization politically feasible but, as we have noted several times, this too will
agreements that may not be development priorities.
6  The suggested formula is an augmented  'Swiss' formula that makes the cut in tariffs a function of the
initial average  level of protection.  It is defined  as:  TX = B x NAV x  To / (B x NAV + To), where  TX is the
final (bound) tariff; B is a parameter to be chosen; NAV is the initial national  average tariff; and To is the
initial (bound)  tariff. The proposal is that all countries bind at least 95% of all tariff lines and value of
imports, but  that LDCs be exempted from tariff cuts. This is not in their interest.  See TN/MA/W/35,
www.wto.org.
7 Finger (1974,  1976)  showed many years ago  that negotiators  are very adept at preventing  free riding by
confining the benefits of MFN tariff reductions to a very large extent to countries that are the 'principal
suppliers'  of the goods concemed and insisting on a quid pro quo from those countries.
8be beneficial  and assist the battle against poverty.  Here we believe a formula-based
approach to tariff reduction-as has been proposed by many WTO members-is
appropriate and useful. This should focus on a commitment by all developing countries to
bind all tariffs, to reduce current tariff bindings to come much closer to applied rates, as
well  as further reduction in applied rates (see Francois and Martin, 2003).  Given the
resource allocation distortions created by tariff structures that are highly differentiated,
one benefit of a formula approach is that it can be used to reduce the variance  in tariffs.9
While reciprocal tariff reductions by developing countries need not fully match the
proposed liberalization in developed countries proposed  above, they must be significant
enough to trigger substantial developed country  liberalization of products of interest to
developing countries. As the variance  in tariffs is higher in developed countries than in
developing economies, while levels of bindings are much higher in developing countries,
a 'Swiss-type'  formula that centers on reducing the average levels of bindings can do
much to both reduce tariff peaks and escalation in OECD countries and give credit to
developing countries for past reforms  (Hoekman,  2002). i°
Services are of great importance to developing countries and there are substantial
opportunities  both to expand exports and to liberalize further access to developing
country markets. While the latter will bring the greatest gains, opening by developed
countries of temporary access to service markets for natural service providers-so-called
mode 4 of the GATS-and a binding of the current liberal policy set that is applied to
cross-border trade (modes 1 and 2 of the GATS)-would both be valuable and assist
governments in pursuing domestic reforms. Walmsley and Winters (2002) conclude that
an opening of developed country labor markets to allow temporary entry by foreign
workers equal to 3 percent of the current workforce would generate welfare (real income)
gains that exceed those that could be attained from full merchandise trade liberalization.
In addition, many developing countries have begun to exploit the opportunities offered by
the internet and telecommunication  networks to provide services through cross-border
8  Several definitions of labour intensive products exist in the literature, which could easily be adapted to
this purpose.
9  See Tarr (2002) for a discussion of the benefits of relatively uniform tariff structures.
10 The  'cocktail' proposal  for possible modalities circulated by the Chairman of the WTO Non-Agricultural
Market Access Negotiating Group  (discussed above) allows for these objectives to be met.
9trade. Currently such trade is largely free of restrictions,  and this desirable  state of affairs
should be locked in through the GATS (Mattoo, 2003).
In the case of services (the GATS), the multilateral  rules allow substantial
discretion to government  to apply policies that discriminate against foreign firms. For
developing countries what matters most is market access-as with goods-and we argue
that this should imply that negotiating modalities  are agreed to focus on the removal of
barriers  to trade on those services  and modes of supply in which developing  countries
have an export interest. Given that the rapid spread of information technology and
telecommunications  infrastructure  is allowing  service firms located in developing
countries to contest markets in richer countries, binding commitments to impose no
restrictions  on such trade would be valuable.  Specific commitments  to open markets
through liberalization of temporary movement of natural service suppliers would also be
very valuable,  although much more difficult to achieve.
2. Developed countries should continue to extend duty-  and guota-free  treatment for LDC
exports on a unilateral basis, and simplify associated rules of origin
In tandem with a commitment to implement deep MFN liberalization by developed
countries on goods and services produced by developing countries, they should provide
duty- and quota free access on a universal basis to all products originating in LDCs,
starting at the conclusion of the Doha negotiations."' Currently the only clearly defined
sub-set of developing countries  in the 1979 GATT Enabling Clause is the LDC group,
and this is the group that has recently been granted deeper preferential  access by major
trading powers.  While it is important to recognize that there are a number of countries
that are not formally classified as LDCs but have similar levels of per capita income and
equally limited supply capacity,  efforts  to move beyond the LDC category will be
divisive and involve arbitrary distinctions between developing countries.  Thus, we
suggest that the focus of full duty- and quota-free access continue  to center on LDCs. 12
" Large, more advanced  middle-income  countries should also consider granting such treatmnent.
12 In principle, equity considerations  suggest that such deep preferences  should also be extended to poor
countries that are not classified as LDCs, and to very small econornies. However,  this runs foul of WTO
disciplines (Part IV and the Enabling Clause)  that require identical preferential treatment to be extended to
all developing countries that are non-LDCs (these provisions allow 'better'  treatment of LDCs).
10Of great importance here is not only the coverage of duty-free access (which
should extend to all products), but also action to apply liberal rules of origin to
preferential  trade. This applies not only to the exports of LDCs, but also to GSP Programs
more generally (Inama, 2002; Brenton, 2003; Mattoo  et al. 2002). Efforts to adopt
identical liberal rules of origin would do much to reduce transactions costs associated
with utilizing preferences.  It is noteworthy that this is an area that has never been subject
to GATT/WTO rules, despite attempts that date back to the 1960s and 1970s (Hoekman
and Kostecki,  2001). Indeed, the lack of progress on simplification and harmonization of
preferential  rules origin is another reason why we favor a MFN-based  approach to market
access for developing country exports to developed countries.
There is a tension between deepening preferences for LDCs and MFN-based
liberalization,  as the  benefit of the former-assuming rules of origin are not too
restrictive-is eroded by the latter.  Given that research suggests that to date many LDCs
have not benefited  significantly from preferences-because  of limited product coverage,
only partial reductions in tariffs, and tight origin requirements  as well as local supply-side
difficulties-there  should be limited concern with the erosion of current preferences that
is associated with a MFN approach.  We recognize the danger that deepening preferences
will increases the scope for future preference erosion and potentially generate more
opposition to MFN liberalization from the beneficiaries. 1
3 Provided not too much is
invested in extending preferences now and provided that the proposed MFN liberalization
is also pursued, this danger can be managed. 4
13 Ozden and Rheinhart (2003a,b)  argue that countries with preferential access  to developed country
markets-even if  it is of limited value due to administrative requirements  and exceptions-have  less of an
incentive  to pursue trade liberalization.
14 Sugar is an example.  Current quota allocations  in protected markets such as the EU go disproportionately
towards  a few countries that are relatively high-cost producers-for  example, Mauritius has 38% of EU
quotas (Mitchell,  2003). Given that a number of LDCs are significant producers of sugar and are lower-cost
suppliers than Mauritius, the extension  by 2009 of duty- and quota-free  access to the EU market for all
LDCs will result in preference  erosion for Mauritius.  This partial unwinding of trade diversion will benefit
more cost-effective  LDC producers but is still costly in global welfare terms. Moving to free trade in sugar
markets would benefit the non-LDC producers, generate  higher global welfare  gains, and increase both
world sugar prices and sugar trade.  It should also be recognized that coordinated global liberalization
across all products will offset some of the lost preference  rents. In the case of sugar, the world sugar price
increase  would offset about half of the lost quota rents for countries that currently have preferential access.
Moreover, the loss in rents would be much less than is commonly expected,  because many of the
beneficiaries of preferences  are high-cost producers, reducing the potential benefit of preferential access to
distorted markets.  The cost to the EU and US of providing  $1 of preferential access has been estimated to
exceed  $5 (Beghin and Aksoy, 2003).Another dimension of preferential  treatment (SDT) in the WTO relates to
commitments  by developed countries to apply instruments  such as antidumping,
countervailing duties and safeguards less vigorously against developing countries through
the use of de minimis and similar provisions. We suggest that such provisions be
maintained, and be understood to apply to exports from all developing countries  as at
present.  This will help to create an element of desirable  differentiation in the reach of
SDT, given that full duty-free  access is provided only to a subset of developing countries.
3. Technical  and financial assistance: actions to help all developing countries improve
their trade capacity should be strengthened by linking such activities to the national
processes through which development aid is provided at the country level.
It is generally recognized that the major constraint limiting export growth in LDCs and
other small and low income countries  is not restrictive market access conditions in export
markets but a lack of supply capacity and the high-cost environment in which firms must
operate.  In addition, firms in these developing countries may find it more difficult to deal
with regulatory requirements  such as health and safety standards that apply in export
markets.  Development assistance can play an important role  in helping to build the
institutional and trade capacity needed to benefit from increased trade and better access to
markets. This assistance must go beyond the implementation of WTO rules narrowly
defined and focus on supply capacity more broadly, as well as addressing  adjustment
costs associated with reforms.  Scarce aid resources  should be allocated to priority areas
that will help to mobilize growth.  Trade-related  areas will normally figure among these
priorities, but not necessarily.
More  funds are needed to address trade-related policy and public investment priorities,
to help low-income  countries adapt to a reduction  in trade preferences  following further
nondiscriminatory trade  liberalization,  and to assist poor net importing countries  to deal
with the potential detrimental  effects of a significant increase in world food prices should
these materialize.  In our view the best approach  is to embed the delivery of trade-related
technical assistance in the national agenda and priority-setting processes that are used by
governments  and the donor community.  The development community made
commitments to this effect  at the International  Conference  on Financing for Development
in Monterrey  in March 2002-what is needed is an equally clear articulation of trade-
12related demands by developing countries. Development  assistance is (and should be)
primarily country-focused.  In order to maximize financing for trade-related  assistance
and to ensure that assistance in this area addresses priority areas for intervention, the
trade-related  technical assistance and capacity-building  agenda must be embedded in a
country's national development plan or strategy.  In the case of low-income countries the
primary example of such an instrument is the PRSP-implying that governments and
stakeholders must take action to embed trade in PRSPs in those instances where trade is
seen as a priority.
It is important to avoid a situation in which a desire by donor countries to see
developing countries implement certain WTO agreements  leads them to divert assistance
flows towards trade institutions at the expense of recipients'  own priorities. For these
reasons, we do not support suggestions (e.g., Finger and Schuler,  2000) to make technical
assistance a mandatory, binding, requirement and to link implementation of  WTO
agreements to the provision of such assistance. We recognize that disallowing such
linkages may make it more difficult to secure  developing country agreement to future
WTO rule changes, but would argue that if developing countries  are to be 'compensated'
for adopting new rules, they should be confident that this is not at the expense of donor
support for other objectives.  Whatever the national priorities are, over time as income
levels and institutional capacity increases, countries will become better able to implement
resource-intensive  WTO rules. Possible approaches  are discussed below.
II. WTO Rules and Economic  Development
Much of the SDT debate centers on issues related to making the WTO more development
relevant,  and the perceived need to both revisit some of the existing disciplines and to
take action to ensure that new,  future, rules support development. Many WTO rules make
sense from a development perspective  (Finger,  1991; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001).
Some do not. Several current agreements need to be rebalanced to reflect developing
country interests-in particular the Agreements on Agriculture  and TRIPS.  More
generally,  looking forward and learning from the experience with Uruguay Round
implementation,  there is a need to recognize that in this area 'one size does not fit all'.
13We make three recommendations  to move WTO rules to be more supportive of
development:
1. Core trade policv rules: Towards common disciplines
We do not support SDT that involves flexibility to pursue trade policies that introduce
distortions to trade through protection.  Hoekman  et al. (2003)  survey some of the
voluminous empirical literature that has investigated the effects of trade protection and its
removal on the performance of firms and industries  in developing countries.  The
overwhelming tendency of this literature is to conclude that the case for using traditional
trade policy instruments such as quotas and quota-like policies such as trade-related
investment measures to achieve economic development objectives is weak. Government
interventions are justified where there are market distortions; but in most circumstances
market distortions should be addressed through interventions other than through trade
(Bhagwati,  1988; Bora, Pangestu and Lloyd, 2000).
This does not imply that developing countries should give up their rights to use all
kinds of trade policies-countries have the right under the WTO to impose tariffs and
quotas  as well as  export taxes if they desire to do so, under certain well specified
circumstances.' 5 Nor does it deny the distortions that are created by industrialized
country trade and subsidy policies, or the need to recognize that there are adjustment
costs associated with trade reforms. What it does imply is that there is a clear ranking of
policy instruments,  with quotas and quota-like instruments being particularly costly, with
both a significant body of theory and evidence suggesting these are not efficient tools to
promote industrial development (Noland and Pack, 2003; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2002).
Not using such instruments will benefit consumers and enhance welfare in developing
countries.  Similarly, there are benefits associated with binding tariffs-including that this
is a major negotiating  coin in the WTO. Moreover,  we argue that WTO rules relating to
transparency of trade policy and to the criteria that should be applied when taking actions
against imports that are deemed to injure a domestic  industry are also beneficial.
15 As is the case  for determining  priorities for development assistance, the priorities and the appropriate  set
of policy instruments to pursue development objectives should be determined at the national level through a
process of consultation in which all stakeholders can participate.
14We recognize,  however, that there are cases where weaknesses in institutional
capacity and severe market imperfections  combined with lack of financial resources may
require that developing countries be permitted to pursue second best trade policies  in
certain well defined circumstances.  Indeed, as part of this a good case can be made that
some existing WTO disciplines and provisions discriminate against developing
countries-for example, the special safeguard provisions of the Agreement on
Agriculture-or are not in their interests. These issues are important and are discussed at
length in Hoekman  et al (2003). In the next sub-section we synthesize the conclusions
that emerge on some of the major WTO agreements. They are best regarded not as
questions of SDT but as a call for revision of the relevant WTO rules (see below).
2. Rule-making and Implementation  of Agreements
A major feature of the  1979 Enabling Clause is that it calls on industrialized countries not
to seek reciprocal concessions from developing countries that are 'inconsistent with their
individual development,  financial and trade needs'. No one supports the making of
inappropriate concessions,  but the overuse of the 'nonreciprocity'  clause has, in the past,
excluded developing countries from the major source of gains from trade liberalization -
namely the reform of their own policies. Non-reciprocity  is also a major reason why tariff
peaks today are largely on goods produced in developing countries.  Reciprocity is the
engine of the WTO negotiating process. By not engaging in reciprocity  countries lose
both a mechanism that can be used to support the pursuit of beneficial trade policy
reforms, but also remove an instrument that can generate better access to export markets.
The reciprocal exchange of trade liberalization commitments benefits all the countries
that engage in the process-this  is one reason why we believe the WTO trade policy rules
should apply to all members.
The value of reciprocity when applied to regulatory policies is much more
doubtful, given analysts'  uncertainty about the appropriateness  of particular policy
instruments, and the differences  between countries'  domestic priorities (Hoekman, 2002).
A good case can be made that when it comes to regulatory policies that affect trade  only
indirectly (if at all), one quickly gets into a situation where apples are traded for oranges,
with significant potential for a negative net outcome  for low-income countries.
15This suggests that attention should focus on redefining the principle of calibrated
reciprocity in the Enabling Clause to apply only to policy disciplines that do not directly
concern trade policies or that are resource-intensive to implement.  In the case of small
and poor countries, there is at least a prima facie case that such agreements may not be
development priorities.  Consider for example the so-called Singapore issues. It is very
difficult to conceive of rules in these areas that do not differentiate  across countries. In
the case of competition law, for example, most developing countries that have such laws
have not had them for long, often have not been enforcing them and generally need to
develop much more experience to determine what works and what does not. To some
extent differentiation across countries can be achieved through the choice of negotiating
modalities. Thus, in the case of investment or trade facilitation, the adoption of a GATS-
type positive list approach to the sectoral coverage or depth of policy disciplines can
ensure that inappropriate commitments  are not made by low-income countries. But such
an approach will be much more difficult to apply to issues such as procurement or
competition policy if the multilateral disciplines are to have meaning.  In these cases there
is a need to recognize that  implementation may be resource-intensive  and not a priority
for low-income  countries.
The ability to implement and to benefit from implementation of WTO disciplines
will vary from country to country, depending not only on size and income but also on
factors such as the skills of the workforce and institutional capacity.  These observations
suggest there is a need for 'differentiation'  between developing countries  in determining
the reach of resource-intensive  WTO rules. The basic rationale for differentiation is that
certain agreements may simply not be development priorities or they may require many
other preconditions to be satisfied before implementation will be beneficial. These
preconditions can be proxied by the attainment of a minimum level of per capita income,
institutional capacity and economic scale. Some WTO disciplines may not be appropriate
for very small countries  in that the regulatory institutions that are required may be unduly
costly-i.e., countries may lack the scale needed for benefits to exceed implementation
costs.
Several options have been proposed to take into account and operationalize
country differences in WTO agreements.  Such "rule-related SDT" could involve:
16*  Total flexibility  for developing  countries as long as other WTO members  are not
harmed (Stevens, 2002);
*  An agreement-specific  approach involving country-based criteria that are applied
on an agreement-by-agreement  basis to determine whether (when) agreements
should be implemented.  This could be linked to the provision of technical
assistance  and development of a national action plan for ultimately assuming the
WTO obligations concerned (Wang and Winters, 2000);
*  A country-based  approach that places  trade reforms priorities in the context of
national  development plans such as the PRSP, and would employ multilateral
surveillance and monitoring to establish a cooperative  framework under which
countries are assisted in gradually adopting WTO norms as part of a more general
program of trade-related reforms (Prowse, 2002; Hoekman, 2002).
Of these options, the first has implicitly underpinned the approach taken in the
proposals made by many countries to the CTD in 2002. Both the second and third
approaches  would allow the issue of defining general eligibility (country differentiation)
to be avoided.  They are also likely to result in more attention being devoted to the
economic  costs and benefits of implementation of WTO rules.  However, they have
downsides as well. An agreement-specific  approach entails  'implementation audits' and
associated negotiations and makes the WTO a focal point for trade-related development
assistance. Reasonable  people may disagree about the magnitude of assessed costs and
benefits or the specific criteria that are suggested for agreement-specific  SDT.
Determining criteria that could be used in the implementation context will require input
from stakeholders,  government agencies and development institutions. While this could
help to strengthen the coherence of policy at both the national and international  levels, it
would also make the WTO negotiation  and enforcement process much more complex.
Widening the set of actors involved in implementation of a new approach towards SDT
may reduce the risk of inducing countries to adopt and pursue a program of trade and
regulatory reform that may not be appropriate,  but care will be needed to ensure that this
would not lead to cross-conditionality.' 6
16 Many countries  were concerned  in the Uruguay Round about avoiding possible "cross-conditionality"
between WTO and international  financial institutions;  this led to a ministerial declaration  on "coherence" to
call for "avoiding the imposition on govermnents of cross-conditionality  or additional conditions" resulting
from cooperation between the WTO and the international  financial institutions.  See Declaration on the
Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic
Policymaking, December  15,  1993.
17A country-specific  approach has the advantage of not centering on WTO
requirements only. The focus would be to support developing countries in managing their
trade reform agenda. Although eminently sensible from a purely development
perspective, it is difficult to make consistent with the binding nature of the WTO
negotiating process. The presumption would be that national considerations would take
precedence over implementation  of WTO  obligations.  In effect it implies a shift towards
development institutions-national  and international-taking  the lead in regulatory areas,
with the multilateral  negotiations focusing on the market access agenda, an area there
they have proved they can do well. This could certainly help to avoid unconstructive
outcomes caused by taking up domestic policy issues in multilateral negotiations  in the
absence of clearly defined developing country priorities and constituent interests.
However, it is likely to be too far-reaching to be acceptable to many WTO members.' 7
Another alternative  is to adopt a rule of thumb - based on variables such as size
and income per head  - that would allow the bulk of the identified difficulties to be
tackled at low (or zero) negotiating cost. This could be done by defining country
eligibility for rule-related SDT provisions more narrowly. Such SDT could comprise an
opt-out for countries that satisfy the criteria and would be broadly applicable across those
disciplines where it has been agreed there are substantial  implementation  issues.'8 This
approach implies redefining the three-fold country group classifications  currently used in
the WTO-the LDCs, all other developing countries,  and the developed country group.
This would seem sensible given that many countries that define themselves as developing
have per capita incomes that are many multiples of those in the poorest countries. Ghana,
Nigeria and Saint Lucia are very different from Argentina and Korea and their
institutional capacity significantly weaker.'9 Their needs for assistance  are much closer to
those of the LDCs than middle and higher income countries which still call themselves
17 Finger (2002)  argues that in the behind-the-border  areas the development  banks must lead. Their
processes  include technical, cost-benefit analysis, their instruments include country-project  specific legal
commitments. These give the development banks comparative advantage  over multilateral negotiations to
address behind-the-border  issues.  In this view, SDT on such issues can never be more than identifying
what the multilateral negotiations  cannot do, not about what they can do to support development.
18 Once countries  have increased per capita incomes or exceeded the criteria thresholds that are established,
the various disciplines would become applicable.  The objective is not to create permanent exclusions.
19 Nigeria meets all the criteria  for LDCs except size, the limit of which has been set at 75 million of
population; but Bangladesh has been grandfathered and is considered an LDC.
18developing.  In our view low income and small economies should be included in SDT.
Others will not.  Although this has been a politically sensitive issue in the WTO, much of
the discussion on greater country differentiation has (implicitly, if not explicitly) been
driven by market access preferences,  where country classification  is inherently arbitrary.
In the case of implementation of resource-intensive  WTO agreements,  a more general
approach based on objective criteria should be feasible. To allow for flexibility, such a
rule of thumb  approach could be supplemented by a fairly demanding appeals procedure
for countries that feel they have been particularly hurt as a result of not satisfying the
20 criteria.
What are the "right" criteria is ultimately something that WTO members must
determine for themselves, and determining which agreements  are resource-intensive  in
the sense used here is an important part of this. Arguably, what matters most at this point
is that WTO members recognize that capacities and priorities differ hugely across the
membership and consider alternative approaches  along the lines sketched out above.
Given the steady expansion of the WTO  into regulatory areas, this would help make
'development relevance' more than a slogan. A new approach towards  SDT that is
anchored much more solidly on economic analysis and a national process of
identification of development priorities could do much to enhance the 'ownership'  of the
institution in developing countries. Whatever the specific approach that is chosen,
agreement on a methodology through which to determine  ex ante the costs and benefits of
implementation will help provide a basis for identifying the rules and disciplines that
small or poor countries should not be expected to implement.  It must be recognized that
some types of rules will fail a cost/benefit test at the level of individual WTO members.21
In the interim, extension of transition periods and postponing implementation  of some
20 Arguments  have also been made in  favor of a less centralized approach to categorization by negotiating
different country categories for different WTO agreements,  on the basis of the presumption that system-
wide categories may not always be the right identifier across different agreements.  Such an approach is
likely to give rise to similar discretion and process-related negotiating costs as a case-by-case  approach. We
believe that when it comes to resource-intensive  agreements there will not be that much variation in the
ability to implement. That is, if a country  confronts institutional/resource  constraints  in implementing
TRIPS it is also  likely to have problems implementing the Agreement on Customs Valuation.
21  An example  of an agreement that may require both significant  investments for implementation  and give
rise to potentially large net resource outflows is the Agreement  on TRIPS.
19agreements  (especially TRIPS) for LDCs and other low income and small economies
should be adopted.
Mechanisms  also need to be strengthened to allow for regular monitoring of the
implementation of SDT. This should extend to the provision of information on trade-
related development funding and investments in trade capacity enhancement,  as well as
to regular reporting to the WTO on the importance of trade-related priorities identified in
national development  plans or strategies. A first step in this direction has already been
taken by the DAC and WTO, building on a database of bilateral  and multilateral
development projects.  More attention is needed at the national level to identify priorities,
where trade issues rank in this overall set of priorities,  and within the trade agenda, what
will generate the highest social rate of return. The Integrated Framework for Trade-
related Technical Assistance is one important vehicle that supports the achievement of
this objective (Tsikata, 2003); the WTO Trade Policy Reviews provide another
mechanism that can be used for this purpose.
3. Rebalancing Existing Agreements
As mentioned, much of the SDT debate revolves  around specific WTO agreements.
Getting agreements  'right' requires an agreement-specific  approach,  and may require
differentiation, not only by type of country, but by an explicit focus on what makes sense
from the point of view of safeguarding the interests of vulnerable  groups in poor
societies. This paper cannot consider all WTO agreements.  Instead, we focus briefly on
two agreement that are of great importance for developing countries-agriculture  and
TRIPS.
2 2
In the case of agriculture,  the so-called  'Green box' of permitted subsidies does
not cover the types of market imperfections that are likely to be found in developing
countries. Developing countries may also need to pursue 'second best' policies insofar as
their realities dictate that in the foreseeable future they will not have the institutional
capacity to pursue first best policies in reducing poverty. An example here is a need to
allow for special safeguards  in agriculture for low-income countries  that do not have the
22  Some of the provisions of the WTO can be argued to be welfare-reducing.  One oft-noted example  is the
latitude to use antidumping.
20capacity to implement an adequate safety net.  The Agreement on Agriculture needs to
focus on a set of measures to enhance  food security and stimulate agricultural production
of the rural poor in developing countries on a permanent basis. These measures  should
not be seen as 'exceptions'  or SDT, but rather as a rebalancing of the rules. Allowance
should be made for:
*  Direct and indirect investment and input subsidies or other supports to households
below the national poverty line in order to encourage agricultural and rural
development.  Such supports could be product specific as well as general-what is
needed is that they are effectively targeted to the rural poor.
*  Programs that support product diversification  in small, low income developing
countries currently dependent on a very small number of commodities  for their
exports, including programs involving government assistance for risk management.
*  Foodstuffs at subsidized prices in targeted programs aimed at meeting food
requirements of the poor, whether urban or rural, as part of an overall effort to
enhance food security.23
*  Transportation  subsidies for agricultural products  and farm inputs to poor remote
areas;
*  Programs involving government assistance  for the establishment of agricultural co-
operatives or other institutions that promote marketing,  quality control or otherwise
strengthen the competitiveness of poor farmers.
*  A  new  Special  Safeguard  provision,  available  only to  developing  countries,  to
provide  rapid  but  time  limited  protection  against  import  surges  that  hurt  poor
producers.
Many of the above provisions were included in the so called 'Harbinson'  draft
that suggests approaches for future liberalization commitments in the current WTO
negotiations  on Agriculture.24 The draft also contains a large number of provisions
permitting developing countries greater leeway in protecting  agriculture through
border measures, such as tariffs and tariff quotas, than would be the case for
developed countries.  Such SDT could be justified because low income developing
countries do not have the fiscal capacity to support agriculture through less trade
distorting direct income supports. On the other hand, this additional flexibility, over
23  Consumption  subsidies are already  available under the WTO, but providing them via producer subsidies
for goods that are barely traded is  generally not permitted because developing countries registered no
subsidies during the Uruguay Round and are bound by a commitment not to increase subsidies  above
historical  levels. The delivery of such subsidies via producers may be desirable for reasons of
administrative simplicity.
24 Curiously, a recommendation  to include programs in support of product diversification has not been
included.  See WTO, Negotiations  on Agriculture,  'First Draft of Modalities for the Further  Comnmnitments'
(Revised),  TN/AG/W/l.Rev. 1,  March  18, 2003.
21time, could also lead to the same kind of inefficiencies  in agriculture as have
undermined competitiveness  of many developing country industries nurtured behind
high protective barriers.
Agreement will be needed on thresholds or criteria to determine to which
countries the above type of provisions will apply. In our view it is important that
criteria include administrative  capacity and an indicator of poverty. As noted above, a
simple measure that could be used is a combination of national GDP per capita,  size
and human development.  One option would be to use a rule-of-thumb approach,  as
proposed above for resource-intensive  disciplines.25
As far as the TRIPS agreement  is concerned, the most appropriate level of
intellectual property protection varies by income level (Grossman  and Lai, 2002; Lai  and
Qiu, 2003).  Thus, low-income countries that are less likely to benefit from domestic
innovation will benefit from staging the implementation of the agreement. Clearly a key
issue is to resolve the difference in views among members regarding the ability of
countries without domestic supply capacity to license firms abroad to provide drugs if
this is deemed necessary to attain public health objectives.  In addition, the TRIPS
agreement  affects the supply of international collective  goods in several areas and is
weak in reflecting developing country (and global) interests.  Possible remedies to this
situation include:
*  Ensuring that TRIPS  is interpreted and implemented in a manner so as to ensure that
governments'  rights to protect public health and ensure access to medicines is not
impeded;
*  Providing for the development of suitable contracts that balance private interests and
public objectives in the area of extracting biogenetic resources from developing
countries;
*  Providing for the establishment of new forms of IPRs over collective  and traditional
knowledge;  and
*  Permitting the reconciliation of possible conflicts between a global IPR system
enforced by the TRIPS agreement and public interest in resource  conservation and
biodiversity.
In these cases, and more generally, more information and analysis of the costs and
benefits of alternative  rules, and the distribution of these costs and benefits,  is also
25  Stevens (2002) develops a very useful checklist that could be used as the basis  for a determination  on
how to classify agreements  from a development/implementation  perspective.
22necessary.  There is often substantial uncertainty regarding both dimensions. Given
substantially weaker social safety nets and insurance mechanisms, and the high rates of
poverty in developing countries that entail much greater vulnerability to negative shocks,
there is a clear need for more attention and resources to be devoted to a costing out of
implementation requirements  and calculation of cost-benefit  ratios. The same applies to
monitoring of outcomes, to allow for policies to be adjusted if necessary.
An important issue that needs to determined is how much can and should be done
up front,  as a  'pre-condition',  and how much of these  types of changes  will  need to be
negotiated.  Clearly  some  of what  is proposed  can and  should  be  implemented  without
reciprocal  concessions-e.g.,  ensuring  that TRIPS  is  interpreted  so  as  to  allow  public
health concerns  to be addressed by governments,  and developing  effective monitoring of
actions  by developed  countries to implement  provisions relating  to technical  assistance,
technology  transfer,  de minimis thresholds,  etc.  However,  most  substantive  changes  to
rules will need to be pursued in the context of negotiations.
III. Moving Forward: Beyond the SDT Review
The SDT discussion in the WTO has focused on specific proposals relating to existing
agreements  and provisions. There has also been a discussion of a possible new 'Framework
Agreement'  and a Monitoring Mechanism to track delivery of SDT and its effectiveness.
During 2002, in response to the mandate by Ministers in the Doha Declaration (para.  44,
see above),  developing countries made some 88 specific  suggestions to strengthen SDT
language in existing WTO agreements and disciplines. The various proposals  can be
classified into four categories:
*  calls for improved preferential access to industrialized country markets;
*  exemptions from specific WTO rules, implying either greater freedom to use
restrictive trade policies that are otherwise subject to WTO disciplines, or
exemptions from rules requiring the adoption of common regulatory or
administrative disciplines;
*  making promises to provide technical  and financial assistance to help developing
countries implement multilateral rules binding, and thus enforceable;  and
23*  expansion in development aid to address supply side constraints that restricted the
ability of firms to take advantage of improved market access.
The discussion of SDT in WTO has been plagued by both procedural and
substantive  disagreements.  In an effort to break the impasse the Chair of the General
Council offered in the spring of 2003  a procedure for dealing with the more than 80 SDT
proposals tabled by the developing countries in the context of the Doha Round. The
proposal by the Chair seeks to move the SDT agenda forward by classifying the various
proposals  into three categories:  a set that should be agreed before or at Cancun (38
agreement-specific  proposals); another group of 38 proposals that would be addressed in
the various negotiating groups that are dealing with the substantive  issues in question as
part of the Doha Round; and a residual set of 12 proposals on which it is clear that
consensus will be very difficult to reach. The Chair proposed to leave cross-cutting
proposals, including those relating to a Monitoring Mechanism, for future deliberation.26
The 'early harvest'  set-Category 1-includes  12 proposals on which agreement
had already been reached during deliberations  in 2002-mostly technical  assistance and
information/transparency-related-as  well as a group that in the Chair's view are
important in terms of having a development impact and where agreement on a
recommendation appears to be possible.  These include proposals relating to Article XVIII
GATT (balance-of-payments  and infant-industry protection), reviews of actions by
developed countries to enhance  developing country trade performance,  favorable
consideration of requests for waivers and transition periods, lowering the burden of
notification requirements under some agreements  (e.g.,  import licensing),  incentives for
transfer of technology under the TRIPS Agreement, and simplification of rules of origin.
The Chair's Category 2 group of proposals span suggestions relating to rules on
regional integration,  antidumping, subsidies, agriculture,  GATS, dispute settlement,  SPS,
TRIMS, safeguards,  and TR[PS.  Several of these proposals, e.g., on TRIPS  and
Agriculture,  are consistent with proposals made in this paper.27 We would disagree with
others, for example some of the proposals to reduce restraints in the use of trade measures
26 See Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, vol. 7,  nos.  13 and  17 (www.ictsd.org).
27 Some proposals have already been agreed in other fora (e.g. the recent TRIPS Council decision for a
review mechanism of developed country efforts to provide incentives for technology transfer to LDCs
under Article 66.2 of TRIPS).
24to address balance of payments difficulties  which are incompatible with good
development practice. We also feel that some of the proposals  in Category 3-e.g., the
proposal to exempt LDCs from the TRIMS  agreement, or the suggestion that LDCs,
"notwithstanding any provision of any WTO Agreement, shall not be required to
implement or comply with obligations that are prejudicial to their individual development
needs..." 28 are  not likely to be beneficial  to developing countries.  Nonetheless,  we agree
with the overall  approach to address specific SDT proposals as part of ongoing
negotiations on these subjects-this is consistent with our suggestion to adopt a re-
negotiation approach to rule-related issues. It can be argued that developing countries
should not be expected to pay again  for improved rules; and indeed in some cases it may
be possible to develop interpretations of the rules which are favorable to development
without formal renegotiation  of the agreement. An obvious example is what is being
considered in the context of TRIPS and health. While this approach should be used as
much as possible, we suspect that  without active engagement in defining and defending
specific rule changes,  the objective of making the rules more development-friendly  will
not be realized. We therefore support the suggestion to (re-)negotiate  when it comes to
the rules of individual agreements.
What the current approach to SDT, including the procedural proposal by the Chair
of the General Council, does not do is go beyond Doha Ministerial mandate on SDT.
While this is understandable,  in our view it is very important that a clear decision be
taken in Cancun to re-think the framework for SDT in the WTO, especially when it
comes to determining the reach of the rules. To a large extent this is as much a forward-
looking issue as it is a backward-looking one (dealing with existing rules).  The
suggestion by the Chair to address most of the substantive SDT proposals in specific
negotiating groups, if adopted,  makes sense  in terms of allowing countries to re-negotiate
existing rules, but could also result in a defacto choice to pursue an agreement-by-
agreement approach to SDT. We argued previously that there are downsides to making
eligibility for SDT within agreements negotiable,  as this could give rise to substantial
transactions costs and uncertainty.  It is important that transparency and predictability is
preserved,  to avoid wasteful strategic behavior and to target SDT to those countries that
28  Proposal by the African Group, TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.2.
25are most in need of it.  In determining  SDT eligibility, non-negotiability once a deal has
been reached is therefore of great importance.  A major contribution of the WTO to world
welfare is that it promotes the transparency and predictability.  These are essential for
both producers and users of internationally  traded goods and underpin the investments
that ultimately help to raise living standards. Thus, our preference is that the WTO
specify broad criteria for access to SDT. If these prove unduly burdensome in exceptional
cases-as may be the case for very small economies-these can be handled by an appeal
to the Committee on Trade and Development and ultimately requests for waivers (based
on existing WTO rules).29
These types of issues are best addressed in the context of designing a new
framework agreement for SDT-the cross-cutting approach that is not the focus of
current deliberations.  What the precise approach should be requires considerable thought,
consultation and debate.30 Realism suggests that it will be very difficult to come to
closure on the complex issues associated with differentiation before the next WTO
ministerial  meeting in September 2003. What can be sought, however, is agreement in
principle to move in the directions advocated above, not least because that would likely
facilitate progress on new subjects (e.g., the Singapore issues). A first step could be to
establish a broad-based,  high-level  group operating under the auspices of the WTO
General Council to explore different options, possible mechanisms  and details of an
alternative  approach, including establishing criteria to determine which rules are
resource-intensive  in implementation, with recommendations to be made before the end
of the Doha Round. The terms of reference of such a working group should be relatively
broad. We would encourage the membership of any group that is established to pursue
such a work program to go beyond the community of trade officials and include both
29  that this approach is very conservative  in tenrs of implied  changes in terms of groups of countries.
To a large extent the approach would be consistent with existing groups identified within the WTO - LDCs
for deep preferential access, current recipients of GSP, which is voluntary and defined by developed
countries individually,  and technical assistance and self-declared developing countries  for advantageous
treatment under safeguards etc. Indeed,  only one new category is called for in the WTO: a set of countries
that should have the right not to implement  resource-intensive  agreements  (and that should also benefit
from proposed changes in the Agreement on Agriculture,  TRIPS, etc.), comprising poor and disadvantaged
countries (LDCs and similarly poor states) supplemented by very small countries where  implementation of
agreements  requiring substantial up front costs and scale economies  is likely to be excessively costly and
that are generally not diversified.
30 See Stevens (2002) and Page (2002) for discussions of options and issues in this connection.
26national economic policymakers and representatives  of the international  development
community.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The traditional approach to SDT in the GATT/WTO  has not been a success in promoting
development.  Indeed, a good case can be made that the approach is fundamentally  flawed
in that it helped create incentives for developing countries not to engage  in the process of
reciprocal  liberalization of trade barriers and the rule-making process.  There is a need to
go beyond the traditional  SDT debate if Doha is to make progress  on helping developing
countries to use trade for development.
First and foremost is to improve access to markets-both developed and
developing. This can do much to help achieve the income MDG target. In our view
market access should be pursued on a MFN basis and rely on the mechanics of
reciprocity, with the major element of SDT comprising  an acceptance on the part of the
major WTO members (large markets) to eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers on the
goods and services  in which developing countries have a comparative  advantage, and
negotiating modalities that give 'credit'  for past autonomous trade reforms.
Second, there is clearly a need to "get the rules right" from a development
perspective,  which will require the re-opening of certain existing agreements.  The heart
of the SDT issue revolves around the need to recognize that one size does not fit all when
it comes to regulatory disciplines and the 'behind the border'  policy agenda that is
increasingly being pursued in the WTO. Here there is a clear need for differentiation,
both in terms of negotiating mechanics-should  reciprocity extend to trading 'apples for
oranges',  e.g., market access for goods in return for rules on domestic policies?-and the
reach of disciplines  across countries. Country differentiation requires  agreement on the
criteria used to define eligibility for SDT. This has for a long.time been a non-starter in
the WTO, with the result that SDT provisions have not been very effective.  Indeed,  the
experience to date suggests that the depth of the differential treatment granted will be
inversely related to the number of eligible countries.  Thus, eligibility for SDT should be
restricted to fewer WTO member countries than is currently the case under the self-
declaration approach that is used to identify developing countries.
27In practice, SDT and 'development relevance of WTO rules' are often conflated
in discussions, with calls for specific types of SDT essentially being motivated by a
perception that a certain rule  is 'anti-development'  and that developing countries should
be exempted  from it. In our view the appropriate solution to such problems is to re-
negotiate the rules rather than seeking an opt-out.  Indeed, defining the negotiating set is
an urgent matter that should be decided by Ministers.
In order to assist developing countries to benefit from market access opportunities
a significant increase is needed in technical and financial assistance to expand supply
capacity and improve the investment climate  in low income countries. The need for this
is acute in absolute terms, but is made even stronger as the trading system moves  in the
direction of lower MFN trade barriers and the consequent erosion of preferences  for those
countries that currently benefit from effective preferential  access. What is required is a
de-linking of development assistance from trade policy-a shift from the current strategy
of permitting a small subset of countries to benefit from the large distortions created by
developed countries on their markets,  to one that puts the emphasis on direct support to
expand trade capacity and improve performance.
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